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United States's Legal Strategy
Patricia Millett'
First of all, I want to thank you for inviting me here
today. It is a privilege to be here, and I hope all of you law
students realize that something very exceptional is
happening here. You all have probably spent one, two, or
three years talking about legal issues like those we litigated
in the Supreme Court. When I went to law school, nobody
spent much time teaching that there are real people behind
cases, and that before you get to go to the Supreme Court,
you have to have a client willing to make that fight. That is
how it works. Law school is a wonderful place, but you
always have to remember that there are real people behind
every case, and I think that has really come home today. It
has been a privilege to hear these stories.
When Mr. Lane said that he was a small part of a
big case, he was wrong. He and Ms. Jones are the case. It
is too easy, particularly for those of us that practice in front
of the Supreme Court, to forget that and just get wrapped
up in the legal issues. I hope you will take that message
home with you. It is certainly something that I will
remember.
I work in the Solicitor General's Office of the
United States Department of Justice and we represent the
U.S. government in the Supreme Court. While it is always
a privilege to handle a case in the Supreme Court, there are
some cases-and this is one-that I will remember
throughout my career. That is not only because of the
interesting legal issues, but most importantly the human
implications of the case for people who face exceptional
challenges and ask for nothing more than fair treatment and
consideration by their government.
1 Ms. Millet is an Assistant to the Solicitor General. She is a Harvard
Law School graduate.
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This case was between Beverly Jones, George Lane,
and the State of Tennessee. Why was the U.S. government
in this case? "We're your government, we are here to
help," I told Mr. Brown. He did not seem to believe me at
first. One of the jobs the Justice Department and the
Solicitor General's office do is defend the constitutionality
of federal law. So, while Mr. Brown just happened to get a
case with this great issue-great federal courts and
constitutional law issues-we had been battling with the
Supreme Court on these issues for years, although we had
not been doing very well. Mr. Brown could be justifiably
unenthusiastic at our arrival on the scene-we came to him
armed with losses in City of Boerne v. Flores,2 Kimel v.
Florida Board of Regents,3 and Board of Trustees- v.
Garrett.4 Although, to our credit, in Nevada Department of
Human Resources v. Hibbs,5 we finally won one. So
maybe we had a little credibility with him.
Tennessee v. Lane6 was case number five in what
thus far had been an ever-expanding list of federalism
losses. The Supreme Court had been cutting back on
Congress's power to enact laws that applied to the states,
both under Section 5, the civil rights power, and the
Commerce Clause power as well. So, at some level, we
were beginning to feel that our job had become to show up
every term of the Supreme Court with a "kick me again"
sign. Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act,
7
while finally decided in part in this case-still not totally
resolved, which I will get to-had already been before the
court multiple times. They had granted certiorari to decide
this issue since the year 2000 in Kimel, in which the
Supreme Court decided Congress did not have the power to
2 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
3 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
4531 U.S. 356 (2001).
5 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
6 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
7 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12300 (2005).
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require the states to pay damages for violations of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act.8 There was also a
disability claim in that case. After they decided the age
issue, they granted certiorari to decide the disability issue.
That case was settled.
Then they granted review in a case coming out of
the Eighth Circuit involving a police officer who had
somewhat limited vision, but performed perfectly fine on a
shooting test. That case was settled.
Then there was the Court's decision in Garrett,
where the Supreme Court decided that Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, which applies to
employment, was not a proper exercise of Congress's
power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Finally, the term before Lane, we briefed the
constitutionality of Title II in a case coming out of
California that dealt with medical licenses for doctors.
That case was dismissed by California shortly before oral
argument. We had been dealing with this issue for quite
some time, and Supreme Court precedent gave little reason
for optimism. We were very conscious of the barriers that
we faced in front of the Supreme Court. Now we do not
have individual clients in the sense that Mr. Brown did.
Our client is the U.S. government and the power of
Congress to enact its laws. Our goal was to stop the
hemorrhaging of congressional power to enforce civil
rights. We accordingly wanted to have Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act upheld as broadly as
possible. Because of what had gone before, there were
some important decisions that needed to be made. After
all, when we first briefed this issue, we did not have
Garrett on the books.
In Garrett, the Supreme Court had held that just a
couple pages in the U.S. Code before Title II there is
another section of the Americans with Disabilities Act-
8 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2005).
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Title I-that is not Section 5 legislation. That is a really
hard precedent to wrestle with. Have you ever been in a
case where they have already held that another part of the
act is unconstitutional? But there was more.
How many of you have heard of a case called Buck
v. Bell?9 Did you hear about that case in favorable terms?
Probably not. Buck was an old Justice Holmes decision
upholding the power of government to sterilize the
mentally retarded. It is generally consigned to the Dred
Scott l° trash bin of judicial decision-making. At least that
is how I learned it in law school, because the Court, in
Buck, seemed to sign onto the whole eugenics movement.
They endorsed the notion that, if you are mentally retarded,
you are the product of bad blood and we should try to
purify society by preventing you from reproducing and, in
that mindset, perpetuating the so-called "problem." It is
terrible language.
In Garrett, the Supreme Court cited that decision,
but not with much blushing. In response to our argument in
that case about a history of discrimination on the basis of
disability and our arguments about the history of
sterilization, the Court responded with "We upheld those.
See Buck v. Bell." Now, I am not suggesting the Court
would decide the case the same today. It would not. But
Buck is evidence of discrimination in our history.
That is where we found ourselves when Lane arose,
which is why we were so cautionary while Mr. Brown was
so optimistic. To Mr. Brown, disability discrimination
seemed so self-evidently a problem. But we were very
conscious that we had to establish special protections for
people with disabilities to overcome a history of
discrimination.
That is what had been recognized in the race
discrimination area. Congress had to have special powers
9 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
10 Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
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to overcome race discrimination because it was so
embedded. Gender discrimination was the same in Hibbs.
I had thought it was simple at first, too, when I first
came to the Americans with Disabilities Act. I thought the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act 1 was largely Congress
in a turf fight with the Supreme Court, eyeball to eyeball
and toe to toe over fundamental conceptions of religious
freedom. But if anything it is Section 5 legislation. If there
is anything Congress is especially equipped to do, it is
protecting the rights of individuals with disabilities because
there is a real history of discrimination in this country.
Sterilization, institutionalization, preventing people from
voting, refusing employment, excluding them from
schools-it is all chronicled in our brief. There is a real,
undeniable history of discrimination here, a complex
history. 1In Cleburne,12 the reason the Supreme Court
applied rational basis analysis was not because they did not
think disability discrimination was a problem. The
rationale in Cleburne was, instead, that the legislature
needs to deal with the recognized problem of disability
discrimination. It is very complicated, and it entails careful
line-drawing and balancing a lot of information that courts
do not have. Cleburne was an institutional decision about
who was better positioned to protect people with
disabilities. I thought Title II is exactly what Section 5
legislation should be. But then along came Garrett.
Since Garrett, the Supreme Court had upheld the
Family Medical Leave Act' 3 in Hibbs. That was our first
law upheld as proper Section 5 legislation since City of
Boerne, and that involved gender discrimination. The
opinion accepted the argument that where there is a
recognized history of discrimination such that the Supreme
" 42 U.S.C §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2005).
12 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
"3 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-54 (2005).
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Court itself has applied heightened scrutiny and thus has
recognized the problem, Congress has greater leeway under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. When you see the
briefs and the arguments in Tennessee v. Lane, there was a
lot of focus on rights subject to heightened security.
Yes, we made the straightforward argument about
disability discrimination under the equal protection clause.
The oral argument also brought up questions about the right
to go to the ice skating rink, though. Quite frankly, why
shouldn't somebody be able to go to a public skating rink
just because they have a disability? If it only costs fifty
cents to make the doors wider, do it so that all your
citizens-all the people government is supposed to work
for-can go ice skating. But we also spent a lot of time
focusing on the fundamental rights that are implicated by
disability discrimination, whether access to the courts,
Eighth Amendment violations in prisons and mental
institutions, First Amendment rights, or the right to vote.
In framing the arguments, there was a focus on the
fundamental rights aspect because it had worked so far
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
When you read the briefs, the other thing that
becomes clear is that the prior cases where the Supreme
Court had held Congress lacked Section 5 authority (other
than Boerne) involved only claims for damages. They
generally involved employment cases, where the substance
of the law could be sustained as Commerce Clause
legislation. There, thus, was no question that Congress
could pass the law and make the states comply with the
law. The Court just held that states do not have to pay
damages. That is the import of the Section 5 ruling in those
cases. The same was true for Title I of the Americans with
Disabilities Act. It is not totally unconstitutional. It still
applies to the states as Commerce Clause legislation,
however no damages can be awarded.
The difficulty with Title II, as we saw it, is it is less
clear. It would be an open question in the Supreme Court's
6
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view-whether the Title is Commerce Clause legislation.
We defend it as Commerce Clause legislation, but it is
challenging in some applications to identify the Commerce
Clause nexus. Access to polling place cases is difficult to
justify as commerce. However, we would win the ice
skating rink-that is commerce. In the brief we tried to
paint a picture of where an adverse holding on the Section
5 power would leave us.
If the Supreme Court says Title II is not valid
Section 5 legislation, and if they were to say that its
application to state capital buildings, state courthouses, and
state polling places is not Commerce Clause legislation,
then where would that leave our country? You would be
able to get into any building, any McDonald's in the
country, and any private building of a requisite size. You
could get into your ice skating rink and your county park
facilities. But you could not get into your capital or your
courthouse, and you could not get into polling places to
vote. How can that be how our Constitution leaves things?
How could a constitutional amendment enacted after the
Civil War to empower then predominantly African-
Americans, freed slaves, have that result? Certainly the
concern of the Fourteenth Amendment's framers was not to
get freed slaves into ice skating rinks.
That was the image our brief attempted to leave in
the Supreme Court's mind.
One more thing about strategies in the case: there
was a significant distinction between our brief and Mr.
Brown's. I think it was helpful for the Supreme Court to
have the two approaches. He focused heavily on access to
the courts and on the "as applied" challenge. You can
argue that something is unconstitutional facially anyway
that it is applied. You also can argue that a law is
unconstitutional in one application and not another.
What Mr. Brown argued is that the court did not
have to decide congressional power to enact all of Title II.
After all, it is a big statute, and it covers everything the
7
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government does-ice skating rinks to courthouses. All he
needed for his clients to win was access to the courts,
which is a clear fundamental right that is not subject to
rational basis scrutiny under Cleburne. It is specially
protected by the Constitution and the Court, and so
Congress has leeway.
Our job is to defend Title II as a whole, from ice
skating rinks to courthouses. So we argued in our brief that
the Court should decide the constitutionality of Title II as a
whole. After all, the whole concept of Section 5 legislation
is that Congress can do more than outlaw things that are
unconstitutional. All of your rights against race and gender
discrimination in employment encompass a lot more than
just what the Constitution requires.
The Family Medical Leave Act certainly provides
more than what the Constitution requires. Congress can
give more under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
than the bare minimum constitutional protection. Our view
was, as some of the states had argued, that the "as applied"
approach would be used to divide and conquer
congressional legislation. Our concern was if you tear this
statute apart and look at it in each application, and ask if we
really need it in each context, the Court will say that you-do
not really need it here, or here, or here. Certainly not in
this day and age. If they could do that, they might also say
a ban on intentional gender discrimination is appropriate
Section 5 legislation, but a ban on employment practices
with a disparate impact is not. Given our general lack of
success in the Supreme Court in recent cases, we thought it
was dangerous to argue that Title II should be divided up
that way and start scrutinizing each application of the
statute. So the Supreme Court had both proposed
approaches before it.
As you know, the Supreme Court did uphold Title
II, but only as applied to access to the courts claims. It was
a great victory, it is a wonderful opinion, it decided a lot of
important issues, and will help with the defense of other
8
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statutes. But we still have the question of where do we go
after Tennessee v. Lane.
We now have to defend Title II in all of its other
applications. We just filed a petition for a writ of certiorari
last month for the Supreme Court to address the
constitutionality of Title II in the context of prison
administration. There is a division in the circuit courts.
One has upheld it, two have struck it down. There was a
recent decision from the Eleventh Circuit a few days ago
upholding Title II as applied to education, but the same
issue is also being litigated elsewhere. We cannot sit back
and say we are done. There are still many more
applications to be dealt with, and it will be up to the
Supreme Court to sort out exactly what lines it wants to
draw on congressional power or whether it will, at the end
of the day, hold, as it should, that Title II in all of its
applications is constitutional. Thank you very much.
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